Using French survey data, we explore empirically whether earnings uncertainty and borrowing constraints decrease households' demand for risky assets, consistent with theoretical predictions. A major empirical problem is the potential endogeneity bias of income risk, as more risk averse households may simultaneously choose safer occupations and invest less in risky assets. Even if we control for households' risk preferences, we …nd that households respond by increasing their stockholdings in response to earnings uncertainty but not to liquidity constraints. We show that these empirical …ndings are consistent with an occupational riskreturn trade-o¤, whereby less risk averse households choose riskier occupations and hold riskier portfolios.
Introduction
Important puzzles have been identi…ed in the economics and …nance literatures when confronting theoretical predictions with real data (equity premium, non-participation, home bias...). Studies using micro-data have improved our understanding (Guiso et al., 2002) . In this paper, exploiting a cross-section of French households, we explore empirically whether earnings uncertainty and borrowing constraints crowd households out from the stock market, consistent with theoretical predictions. So far, the empirical evidence is mixed. Arrondel et al. (2010) for France, Guiso et al. (1996) for Italy, Massa and Simonov (2006) for Sweden or Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for the US provide evidence consistent with theoretical predictions, while Alessie et al. (2002) for The Netherlands or Arrondel and Masson (2003) for France, do not. An important issue is how to measure income risk and the extent to which it is exogenous (e.g. Lusardi, 1997, or Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005) , as more risk averse households may simultaneously prefer to work in safer occupations and hold more conservative portfolios. To capture earnings uncertainty, we elicit a self-assessed measure (Guiso et al., 1996) , and to control for the potential selectivity bias, we instrument income risk and introduce the measure of aversion to gamble on lifetime earnings proposed by Barsky et al. (1997) .
Even if we control for tastes for risk, our empirical results do not support the proposition that households who are more exposed to earnings risk choose to bear less …nancial risk, at odds with the theoretical predictions of the literature on "temperance" in households'portfolios (Kimball (1993) , Gollier and Pratt (1996) ). However, they do support the negative e¤ect of borrowing/liquidity constraints, con…rming that the actual or expected inability to borrow raises risk aversion. To rationalise these apparently contradictory empirical …ndings, we adopt Drèze and Modigliani's (1966) unpublished insight, according to which the choice of an occupation also has a risk-return component, even if earnings (i.e. the proceedings of human capital) are non-tradable. Saks and Shore (2005) …nd evidence in the US consistent with individuals choosing optimally their earnings risk exposure early in their lifes. As they age however, households'earnings become progressively beyond their control, because of either the substantial occupational switching costs (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009) , or the important irreversible investments undertaken both at school or onthe-job.
We therefore extend Campbell and Viceira's (2002) static constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) -Lognormal framework to obtain (approximate) analytical solutions for optimal portfolio shares and optimal occupational risk exposures. The advantages are three-fold: (i) CRRA preferences display the property of decreasing absolute risk aversion, which empirically explains individuals' occupational risk exposures (Saks and Shore, 2005) ; (ii) in the face of a zero mean additive background risk on earnings, CRRA preferences are su¢ cient to trigger a reduction in optimal portfolio risk ex-1 posure ("temperance") 1 , which is the real trigger behind the negative e¤ect of an uncertain future liquidity requirement. Finally, (iii) the results can easily be extended to an intertemporal framework. The main prediction is that occupational and …nancial risks become complements, while preserving the negative impact of borrowing and liquidity constraints, as we observe empirically.
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we brie ‡y describe the main hypothesis under scrutiny and the corresponding basic econometric speci…cation. In section 3 we describe and explain the construction of the main variables. In section 4, we report the main empirical …ndings while discussing their robustness. Section 5 presents the theoretical model and discusses it in light of the empirical evidence, and …nally section 6 concludes.
The Tempering E¤ect of Background Risk
The classical theory of portfolio choice was developed in a complete markets framework, meaning that all individual risks could be traded. But severe informational restrictions preclude most households from insuring their most important source of lifetime income: their human capital.
That observation motivated the reconsideration of the complete markets assumption (Drèze and Modigliani, 1972) .
A theoretical extension to incomplete markets of the static portfolio choice model has formalized the following common wisdom intuition: when risk averse households are confronted with a risk beyond their control or 'background'risk, they should decrease their exposure to avoidable risks in order to adjust their desired total risk exposure (e.g. Kimball, 1993, or Gollier and Pratt, 1996) .
Households observing this behavior are called temperant. 2 Accordingly, those who su¤er more from uninsurable earnings risk should choose to be less exposed to …nancial risk, ceteris paribus. Also, since income risk entails an uncertain (future) liquidity requirement, currently (or expected to be) liquidity constrained households should hold even safer portfolios. 3 These theoretical predictions can be summarized by the following reduced form equation for the share (A=F ) of risky assets (A 0) in total …nancial wealth (F ):
Where cl is the expected probability of being liquidity constrained, y is the self-assessed standard deviation of earnings, is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and X is a vector of covariates that include demographics to proxy for heterogeneity in tastes (marital status, family size, gender, urban/rural residence), household income and total net wealth as measures of their initial endowment, and …nally variables chosen according to the theory, e.g. transaction/information costs lead to incomplete portfolios (King and Leape, 1998) , that will in turn be determined by the stock of 1 Preferences are then said to be "risk-vulnerable", in Gollier and Pratt's (1996) terminology. 2 Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006, p. 283 ) have further characterized temperance as a preference for the separation of two independent zero-mean background risks over the bundling of them.
3 See Gollier (2001), ch. 18. 2 …nancial information (proxied by age, education and parents'wealth composition).
Empirical Analysis
We rely here on the "Patrimoine 98" wealth survey conducted by the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) on a nationally representative sample of 10,207 households, for whom detailed information on earnings, income, wealth and socio-demographic characteristics is available. 4 A part of the questionnaire tries to give us a general idea of individuals'degree of exposure and aversion to risk, as subjectively perceived and assessed by them. Only 4,633 individuals (corresponding to 2,954 households) answered to these questions. Table 1 reports averages of earnings, wealth and demographic characteristics for the total and selected samples.
( Table 1 about here)
The amount of risky assets held (A) in equation (1) is de…ned by (i) the sum of stocks of privatized public companies, listed shares of private companies and stocks of foreign …rms (direct stockholdings), and by (ii) those held through mutual funds and managed investment accounts (indirect stockholdings). We exclude bonds from the risky asset category, as well as homeownership. 5
20.5% of the sampled households are direct stockholders, while 30% hold risky assets either directly or indirectly.
To construct a proxy for the subjective standard deviation of household income, we asked each income recipient to attribute probability weights (100 points) to given intervals of 5-year-ahead real income increases. 6 The mean of the standard error of anticipated income shocks 7 (between 6.2% and 14.9% of current earnings) is of an order of magnitude similar to the estimates reported by Guiso et al. (1996) , but surprisingly low when compared to panel data estimates. 8
To obtain a measure of risk aversion, we follow Barsky et al. (1997) and infer risk preferences from hypothetical gambles over life time income. Individuals are assumed to distaste risk and that their preferences are in the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class. The outcome is a range measure (in four brackets) for the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient ( ). Out of the 3,483 4 In Arrondel et al. (2010) we exploit data from a di¤erent survey, the Delta-TNS 2002 survey, which only covers a representative sample of 4,000 French households within the 35-55 age bracket.
5 Arrondel and Masson (2003) argue that homeownership status in France is better explained by the ‡ow of services it provides, rather than by the expectation of an investment return. 6 The sample average of expected income growth (around 1.5%) is roughly consistent with French time series evidence for the preceding period (around 1. 8% over 1990-98) . 7 Assuming that …ve years ahead expected real income is yt+5 = (1 + g)yt; the formula for the anticipated standard deviation of household income is StdDev(yt+5) y = yt g ; where yt is current real income, g is the expected growth rate of real income, and g its standard deviation. In Appendix 2, Table A .2, the frequency distribution for the standard deviation to income ratio y =yt (when 50% bounds are used) shows that 41% of the households hold point expectations. Only 8% display a ratio above 15% of current earnings. Although we chose the units-free standard deviation measure of earnings uncertainty, our results remain unchanged when we replace it by the variance or by the standard deviation to income ratio ( y =yt).
8 The gap between both is commonly explained by (i) overestimation of true "uncertainty" in econometric regressions (Dominitz, 2001) , (ii) neglected within interval variation, (iii) underreporting of the probability of very low income events, and/or (iv) measurement error in survey responses. See Guiso et al. (1996) or Lusardi (1997) 11.2% display moderate risk aversion (2 > 1) while only 6.3% quali…ed as low risk averse
(1 > ). 9 Controlling for demographic and economic factors, those who are more risk tolerant are also more willing to take risk in …nancial decisions and more likely to become self-employed (excluding farmers). 10 Finally, to capture households' ability to gain access to credit markets, two questions in the survey identify both 'discouraged borrowers' and 'turned down applicants'. The variable that proxies for liquidity constraints takes value one if households quali…ed themselves in either category.
11,7% of the surveyed households are liquidity constrained (346 out of 2954).
Econometric Results
To estimate the demand for risky assets as in model (1), a two-stage decision process is assumed.
Households choose …rst whether or not to hold risky assets (a Probit model is used) and then they decide how to allocate total …nancial wealth between safe and risky assets. Conditional on participation, the second stage estimates the fraction of …nancial wealth invested in risky assets (conditional asset share), introducing the inverse Mills ratio to correct for the selectivity bias.
Economic theory predicts that di¤erent sets of explanatory variables explain the di¤erent stages, e.g. King and Leape (1998) argue that information costs explain essentially the decision to enter the stock market. Accordingly we introduce education and the presence of risky assets in parents' wealth only in the Probit model. 11 (Table 2a about here)
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2a report the two-step estimation results for the narrowest de…nition of risky assets (direct stockholdings). Stock of information variables increase the probability of risky asset ownership: Households whose parents owned stocks are about 11.2 percentage points more likely to hold stocks directly. A second-order polynomial in age con…rms that the probability of stockownership attains its minimum for young households, increasing through the life cycle to reach a maximum at the age of 46.
Income and net worth induce stock market participation, consistent with the presence of …xed transaction costs (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002 ) and/or risk preferences decreasing in wealth (DARA).
Households who expect to be liquidity constrained are less likely to invest in risky assets. 12 Moving a household from the 10th to the 90th percentile of probability to be deterred from applying for credit in the future reduces the probability of stockownership by 8,5 percentage points.
Contrary to economic theory predictions, the coe¢ cient of the expected standard deviation of 9 Sahm (2007) or Chiappori and Paiella (2008) use panel data to con…rm that relative risk aversion is constant in both the American HRS and the Italian SHIW, respectively. 1 0 In Appendix 1, King and Leape (1998) , the conditional asset demand equation (Table 2a , column 2) is poorly explained. When we estimate a simple Tobit model for the share of risky assets, the results below column 3 of Table 2a con…rm that the income risk coe¢ cient is always positive.
( Table 2b about here)
Since only a small fraction of households report positive amounts of risky assets, we have also explored the sensitivity of the results to a broader de…nition of risky assets (direct or indirect stockholding) for both the two-step and Tobit estimations (Table 2a , columns 4 and 5, and 6, respectively). For most variables, the estimates are similar to those obtained with the narrow definition, although the e¤ects appear statistically stronger. Since 5-year-ahead real income increases are unbounded above and below in the questionnaire, Table 2a contains the results when 50% bounds are used. Because households'…nancial behaviour has been found to be sensible to the size of income shocks (Carroll, 1997) , Table 2b reports our estimation results when 100% bounds are imposed instead. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 13 To control for households who, being more risk averse, may have self-selected into safer jobs we: (i) have introduced Barsky et al.'s (1997) individual measure of aversion to gamble on life time earnings, and we (ii) instrumented the earnings variance by a qualitative variable capturing the frequency and severity of …nancial distress at home while young 14 . We also included in the instrument set the own subjective probability of unemployment, past own health problems and own subjective transition probability to self-employment as well as di¤erent proxies for social status and portfolio composition of the household head's parents. The positive and signi…cant e¤ect of income risk on either de…nition of stockholdings remains.
( Table 3 ) do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of exogeneity in either the two-step or in the Tobit speci…cations. Therefore, the non-instrumented model is preferred as long as the instruments are valid, which is the case.
1 3 Unreported results show that when we restrict the sample to households with an active head, the e¤ect of income risk is even stronger: households who have no risk on their earnings were about 5.6 percentage points less likely to hold stocks directly than those in the highest earnings risk decile.
1 4 Although there is a statistically signi…cant positive correlation between the instrument and Barsky et al.'s (1997) measure of risk aversion (LR test statistic = 9:8; P = 0:0441), to the extent that the latter is also included separately in the two-stage regression, the potential endogeneity caused by an interegenerational transmission of risk preferences (Kimball et al., 2009) is not an issue.
5

A Theoretical Explanation
The empirical results provide mixed support to households rebalancing their stockholdings away from risky assets to compensate for their exposure to uninsurable income risk. On one hand, liquidity constrained households e¤ectively hold less risky assets. On the other hand, households who are more exposed to earnings risk appear to invest more in risky assets, against theoretical predictions.
These apparently contradictory …ndings can be rationalised if households do actually choose their occupations also as a function of the risk embedded in life-cycle earnings pro…les (PalaciosHuerta, 2003; Saks and Shore, 2005; Sahm, 2007) . 15 The choice of an occupation corresponds then to an optimal earnings risk exposure. However, as they age, the risk on earnings becomes progressively beyond their control, or a background risk. Households …nd themselves "lockedin" either because of the irreversible nature of human capital investments (at school or on the job) or because of the considerable costs associated with switching occupations (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009) . If preferences towards risk are invariant through the life-cycle, cross-sectional data on portfolios and earnings risk should then reveal that more risk averse households hold both more conservative portfolios and safer occupations. This is precisely what Drèze and Modigliani (1966) claimed in an unpublished extension of their famous article (Drèze and Modigliani, 1972) . ( 16 ) Here, we capture their insight within Campbell and Viceira's (2002) static CRRA-Lognormal framework, extending it to obtain an (approximate) analytical solution with three main advantages:
(i) the main e¤ects of interest become apparent, and the conclusions can be easily extended to an intertemporal framework; (ii) we do not need to resort to an intertemporal framework to capture the impact of decreasing risk aversion on occupational choice, empirically identi…ed by Saks and Shore (2005) ; and (iii) CRRA preferences belong to the broader class of HARA functions, for which Gollier and Pratt (1996) show that individuals exposed to a zero mean additive background risk will optimally choose to invest less in risky assets ("temperance") . In what follows, upper case letters are used for the variables of interest, while lower case letters denote the natural logarithms of them.
The problem a household faces is how to invest her initial …nancial wealth holdings, W 0 ; when there are only two assets available: a risky asset promising to deliver tomorrow a random return 1 + e R and a riskless asset promising the delivery of a sure return (1 + R) : Her individual objective function is a continuous, di¤erentiable representation of her preferences that admit an expected 1 5 A di¤erent explanation relies on the intertemporal e¤ect of background risk, examined by Elmendorf and Kimball (2000) . They show that a background risk on earnings will also trigger a precautionary increase in savings, part of which will be optimally invested in risky assets by decreasingly risk averse households. Haliassos and Michaelides (2002) provide an in-depth discussion of this mechanism, and calibrate a realistic model of household portfolios using data from the US Survey of Consumer Finances. 1 6 Quoting them: "... de telle sorte que le consommateur exerçant une activité plus aléatoire (par choix) aura également des placements plus risqués (...). C'est le sens de notre proposition [6.6, p. 29]." utility form over …nal consumption,
where e Y e represents uninsurable endogenous earnings. Household earnings come from the inelastic supply of one unit of time, T = 1; which can be optimally allocated between a relatively 'riskless occupation'and a relatively 'risky'one. If we denote by the fraction of available time invested in the risky occupation, e I are the corresponding earnings, and (1 )I the earnings from the time devoted to the safe occupation. Then labour earnings are expressed as:
Denoting by the share of initial wealth invested in the risky asset, the portfolio return is e R p = e R + (1 )R. Assuming that household preferences are in the constant relative risk
wu 00 (w) u 0 (w) , and that earnings and portfolio returns are statistically independent, we can write the solution to her individual optimization problem as 17 :
Ye expf 1 2 2 y g expfEe rp+w 0 g is the inverse elasticity of …nal consumption with respect to …nancial wealth, or equivalently, it is the ratio of average total wealth (human and non-human) to average …nancial wealth, [1+R] denotes the log expected excess returns and 2 z their variance. Finally, s log E e I I is the log expected excess earnings, and 2 the corresponding variance. Several remarks follow, mostly on (6): Remark 1: s > 0 denotes the risk premium required by the household in order to devote a positive fraction of its time to the risky occupation. Evidence of such a risk premium has been recently found by Nielsen and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) . 18 Remark 2:
captures two e¤ects, ceteris paribus: (i) households endowed with more nonhuman initial wealth devote more time to the risky occupation, obtaining higher expected earnings 1 7 Campbell and Viceira's (2002) log-linear approximate solution method proceeds in three steps. First, the budget constraint and the Euler equations are replaced for log-linear second order Taylor approximations around the …xed point solution. Second, it looks for optimal portfolio and job allocations that verify the log-linear equations. Finally, it identi…es the coe¢ cients of the optimal allocations using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. A complete derivation for the general case in which portfolio returns and earnings are correlated, can be found in Appendix 2.
1 8 Using a large Danish panel data set on labour incomes, they …nd that "...individuals require an increase of about 25 percent in their starting labour income in order to be willing to accept an increase in the variance of the permanent shock from its 25th percentile to its 75th percentile". since s > 0. This is the non-human wealth e¤ect empirically identi…ed by Saks and Shore (2005) ;
(ii) it also measures indirectly the extent to which the non-tradability of human capital matters for stockholdings. If …nal consumption is essentially …nanced by …nancial wealth (value of e close to 1), the stockholder will behave as if markets were e¤ectively complete. Conversely, if …nal consumption is essentially …nanced out of human wealth (value of e close to 0), the stockholder will invest agressively in risky assets to take advantage of the positive portfolio return, while taking a more conservative strategy in choosing the time devoted to the risky occupation. The e¤ect of e on stockholdings is absent if human capital is tradable, for then (under independence) the optimal portfolio share is the myopic solution 19 :
Interestingly, the optimal occupational risk exposure is also weighted by the inverse elasticity of consumption to human wealth,
ye ; suggesting that the e¤ect identi…ed by Saks and Shore (2005) is also at work even when human capital is tradable 20 .
Remark 3: More risk averse households (higher ) rationally choose both safer occupations (6) and more conservative portfolios (5), ceteris paribus. This is what the next proposition formalizes:
Proposition 1 When portfolio returns and labour earnings are independently distributed, both risks are complements even if earnings are non-tradable:
Proof. See appendix 2. ( 21 ) Hence across occupations, di¤erences in risky asset demands are positively correlated with differences in non-diversi…able earnings risk.
Remark 4: However, within occupations (holding DM …xed) individuals display a temperant reaction to earnings uncertainty. If investments in human capital are sunk, non-tradable and the costs associated with switching occupations are considerable, earnings become e¤ectively a background risk ( DM …xed) as households age. Since CRRA preferences are in the HARA class, 1 9 When we allow for an endogenous choice of earnings risk, and that risk can be traded, the budget constraint of the household becomes:
and CRRA preferences together with portfolio returns and earnings being independent joint lognormally distributed guarantee that the "myopic" portfolio share is optimal. See Appendix 2 for a proof. 2 0 When human capital is endogenous and tradable, the term 1 1
captures an allocational imbalance in terms of human versus non-human wealth: if the household only has human wealth to …nance consumption, it will still hold the myopic optimal portfolio share but will ceteris paribus choose a safer occupation than a household endowed with a very large non-human to human wealth ratio. Hence, it is not because human capital is non tradable that richer households choose high-risk high-return professions in terms of earnings, it is simply because being richer, their consumption depends less on earnings risk (DARA e¤ect).
2 1 Proceeding instead as Campbell and Viceira (2002, p.173) do (on the basis of the log-linearized …rst order Taylor expansion of endogenous earnings), one can …nd a su¢ cient condition that depends on the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient ; i.e. if
8 the temperant e¤ect of a background risk on the optimal portfolio share (5) can be understood by decomposing the di¤erence relative to the optimal portfolio share when markets are complete, (7) : 22
where
Ye expfEe rp+w 0 g ; since 2 y > 0 means that exp 1 2 2 y < 1: The equality from (9) to (10) follows from adding and subtracting the optimal portfolio 1 Ee z 2 z of a household with certain but non-tradable labour income y = E e Y e : The …rst additive term in (10) captures the negative e¤ect on the complete markets optimal share of introducing an independent zero-mean background risk e " e Y e y : Ee " = 0 (risk-vulnerable reaction, in Gollier and Pratt's, 1996, terminology). The second term in (10) captures the positive e¤ect on of introducing a degenerate independent background risk that assigns probability 1 to its positive mean E e Y e = y > 0; and zero elsewhere. Since CRRA preferences display decreasing absolute risk aversion, richer households are more willing to invest in stocks 23 .
Empirical Implication.
Because the variance of log-labour earnings is an increasing function of the optimal occupational risk exposure, 
where med 2 y denotes the median value of the variance of log-earnings,
dF ( 2 y ) = :5; and is used as a bechmark.
Inserting (10) into (11), the e¤ect of earnings uncertainty both within and across occupations 2 2 In Arrondel et al. (2010) we adopt this same decomposition to study the tempering e¤ect of a correlated background risk. Here instead, we assume that it is independently distributed of stock market risk, because the survey question exploited there (Delta-TNS 2002 survey) is unavailable in the data set exploited here (INSEE-Patrimoine 1998 survey).
2 3 Campbell and Viceira (2002, pp. 172-3) examine instead the e¤ect of a mean-preserving increase in log-labour earnings uncertainty ( 2 y ) on the optimal allocation to risky assets. Since our model coincides with theirs when the optimal level of exposure to earnings uncertainty is exogenous ( DM …xed), the condition to observe a temperant reaction is the same: Only su¢ ciently risk averse individuals ( 1 e ) will tilt their portfolios away from risky assets when enduring a mean-preserving increase in earnings uncertainty,
If however we examine the overall e¤ect of a mean-preserving increase in log-labour earnings uncertainty ( 2 y ) on the optimal allocation to risky assets when DM is endogenous, even su¢ ciently risk averse individuals ( (not interacted), and the less risky occupational category is used as reference, expression (12) predicts that the estimated dummy coe¢ cients should be jointly signi…cant and positive, i.e. the "(+) ACROSS occupations: Self-selection" term in (12) captures the degree of complementarity between earnings and portfolio risks. Although with the available cross-sectional survey data we cannot disentangle both, notice that according to it, the importance of earnings risk may have been seriously underestimated because of the two con ‡icting e¤ects.
Conclusion
While the theory of temperant portfolio choice predicts a negative impact of uninsurable risks on the demand for risky assets, its empirical evaluation is quite a di¢ cult task. Using a comparable methodology to Guiso et al. (1996) , our empirical results do not support the proposition that income risk depresses households' demand for stocks in France even if we are able to control for di¤erences in risk preferences, and for the potential endogeneity of the self-assessed income risk variable. But liquidity constraints are found to have an empirically sizeable negative impact.
To rationalize these apparently contradictory …ndings, a theoretical explanation consistent with restrictions on preferences su¢ cient to trigger temperant portfolio rebalancing in the presence of a background risk is advanced, the origins of which date back to Drèze and Modigliani's (1966) unpublished work. When occupations can be characterized in terms of the riskiness in the associated life-cycle earnings pro…les, individuals with di¤erent preferences for risk are going to self-select into them accordingly. Since the same risk preferences govern their …nancial decisions, more risk averse individuals are going to hold both safer occupations and more conservative portfolios. When switching occupations is very costly, and important irreversible investments are undertaken both at school or on the job, as individuals age they loose their ability to choose the optimal degree of occupational risk exposure, which e¤ectively becomes a background risk. Hence, across occupations, individuals more exposed to earnings risk are also going to hold riskier portfolios, but to the extent that preferences satisfy the su¢ cient conditions to observe a temperant reaction, within occupations, individuals who are more exposed to earnings risk are also going to hold more conservative portfolios. To the extent that households choose their occupations early in their lives, and that information at that stage is at best incomplete, unanticipated income shocks in mid-or late stages of their life-cycles are likely to trigger a temperant reaction across occupations. The e¤ect is re-inforced both by the sunk investments undertaken either at school or on-the-job, as well as by the substantial costs to switch (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009 ) towards occupations carrying less earnings risk at the expense of a lower mean.The latter is what drives the negative e¤ect of borrowing/liquidity constraints on …nancial risk exposure, empirically detected.
Being empirically di¢ cult to disentangle both con ‡icting e¤ects of earnings risk when exploiting the cross-sectional variation, it is likely that the actual magnitude of the negative impact of earnings uncertainty on households' portfolios has been underestimated. Age-speci…c group studies, like Lusardi (1998) 27 , or realistically calibrated quantitative macroeconomic studies, like Benzoni et al. (2007) 28 , point in that direction. Although here we have only examined the implications of a risk-return trade-o¤ in occupational choice within a static portfolio choice model, its extension to an intertemporal dynamic framework promises fruitful future research.
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Appendix 1: Description of Main Variables
We mostly rely here on the "Patrimoine 98" household survey. A nationally representative sample of more than 10,000 households was drawn and a comprehensive interview survey of their wealth was conducted by French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE). Part of the questionnaire tries to give us a general idea of individuals'degree of exposure and aversion to risk, as subjectively perceived and assessed by them. It consists of a recto-verso questionnaire, which was distributed to the interviewees at the end of the …rst interview. This page submitted to the whole sample of 10,207 households must be …lled in individually by the interviewee and his/her spouse (if applicable) and returned by post to the INSEE.
Total net wealth. In the survey, the individual is asked to say in which of the 9 prede…ned available brackets is her family. Since we are interested in a continuous measure we have used the method of simulated residuals (Gouriéroux et al., 1987) . For each asset category, we have computed the value net of debt for each household. We have then regressed the net worth of each asset on some household characteristics. Once we have the estimated total net household wealth per asset category, a normally distributed error is added.
After that, we check if the value falls inside the bracket chosen by the individual. If not, another normal error is added and so on until we predict the interval chosen. Doing so allows us to overcome the non-response problem for some households. If there is a missing value, the predicted value plus a normal error is directly used. Total net wealth is given in French francs.
Income. The survey directly asks each respondent to self-report income as a continuous variable. Income refers to the household's annual income in French francs.
Income risk. To construct a proxy for the subjective standard deviation of expected household income, each household is asked to distribute 100 points between di¤erent scenarios regarding the evolution of income in the next …ve years. The procedure mimics the wording in the 1989 " Survey of Household Income and Wealth " (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy, successfully exploited by Guiso et al. (1996) , and subsequently loathed by Dominitz and Manski (1997) You dispose of 100 points to be distributed among the 8 items, according to the degree to which you agree or you disagree with the relative statement.'
The respondent is asked about the subjective relative likelihood p i k of di¤erent scenarios (k) regarding the percentage change (y) in households' real income …ve years ahead from the time of the interview, y = y t+5 yt 1 :
Where for example, scenario k = 1 speci…es a range of values in the support of the expected income percent change y given by y k ; y k = (:25; +1) : Combining the subjective relative likelihoods, with the median points of the di¤erent ranges (imposing a uniform within each subinterval), we can impute a subjective variance ( 2 y ) for the expected …ve-year ahead percent change (Ey) in each respondent's income,
Since the upper and lower subintervals are unbounded, we impose bounds of :5 and 1; corresponding to 50% and 100% changes respectively. Since y =
We assume that the variance of household income can be proxied by the variance estimated by the respondent or, when there were two respondents in the household, the variance evaluated by the head of the household.
( Table A1 about here) Table A1 displays the frequency distribution of the ratio of the subjective standard deviation of expected household real income to current income ( =y). Two such measures are calculated depending on the values adopted for the upper and lower bounds (respectively 50 and 100%). More than forty percent of those surveyed hold point expectations about …ve-year-ahead real income changes. For almost half (46 percent) of the respondents, the standard error is between 0 and 10 percent. Only …ve percent display a measure of uncertainty exceeding 15 percent. For the whole sample, the mean of the standard error of earnings to current income ratio is about 6.2 (resp. 14.9) percent.
Relative Risk Aversion. To obtain a measure of risk aversion, we asked individuals about their willingness to gamble on lifetime income according to the methodology of Barsky et al. (1997) . The "game" resides in determining sequentially whether the interviewee would accept to give up his present income and to accept other contracts, in the form of lotteries: he has one chance in two to double his income, and one chance in two for it to be reduced by one third (contract A), by one half (contract B), and by one …fth (contract C). More precisely, the question in the survey was:
'Suppose that you have a job which guarantees for life your household's current income R. Other companies o¤er you various contracts which have one chance out of two (50%) to provide you with a higher income and one chance out of two (50%) to provide you with a lower income.
Are you prepared to accept Contract A which has 50% chances to double your income R and 50% chances that your income will be reduced by one third?
For those who answer YES : the Contract A is no longer available. You are o¤ered Contract B instead which has 50% chances to double your income R and 50% chances that it will be reduced by one half. Are you prepared to accept?
For those who answer NO : you have refused Contract A. You are o¤ered Contract C. which has 50% chances to double your income R and 50% chances that it will be reduced by 20%. Are you prepared to accept?' This allows us to obtain a range measure of relative risk aversion under the assumption that preferences are strictly risk averse and utility is of the CRRA type. The degree of relative risk aversion is less than 1 if the individual successively accepts contracts A and B; between 1 and 2 if he accepts A but refuses B; between 2 and 3.76 if he refuses A but accepts C; and …nally more than 3.76 if he refuses both A and C.
Among the 4,633 respondents to the questionnaire, 3,483 individuals participated in the lottery.
( Table A2 about here) Table A2 reports the fraction of all respondents (…rst line) and of those older than 50 (second line) who fall into the four risk aversion categories. The results in the second line can be compared to those obtained by Kimball et al. (2008) France only 6 percent accept contract B, in the U.S. the acceptance rate ‡uctuates from more than twice in 1992 (12.8%) to a similar 7.3 percent in 1998. Kimball et al. (2008) argue that the discrepancy can be explained by the status quo bias from which the wording of the question su¤ered previous to the 1998 HRS waves. Notice that the wording of the question in French places the respondent in a hypothetical (status quo bias free) situation.
( Table A3 about here) log [1 + exp fe r p + w 0 e y e g] ' log [1 + exp E fe r p + w 0 e y e g]
And using the de…nition of ; we can rewrite the …rst two terms on the RHS as log Taking a second order Taylor expansion of the RHS around e i i = 0 yields:
Since the authors further replace h e i i i 2 by its expectation E h e i i i 2 2 i = 2 ; household log income becomes:
Both expressions (A.1) and (A.2) hold exactly in continuous time. Replacing them in the log-budget constraint yields:
Now solving the program:
Yields the FOCs:
which are the standard Euler conditions. They can be rewritten as E h e C( ; ) (1 + e R)
. Taking logs of both sides in both, and using the facts:
(i) e C; e I and (1 + e R) are jointly lognormally distributed, (ii) log EX = E log X + 1 2 V log X and (iii) X log N (E log X; V log X) =) X t log N (tE log X; t 2 V log X) we obtain:
Ee c + Ee r + And substituting in the approximated log-budget constraint derived above, yields:
Ee r r + 1 2 2 = e 2 + (1 e ) ir E e i i + [1+R] the log expected excess returns, 2 z 2 the variance of the log excess returns and by iz
Cov( e i i; e r r) = Cov( e i; e r) = ir the covariance between log excess earnings and the log excess returns, so that = iz i z corresponds to the correlation coe¢ cient between both. Finally, s E e i i + 2 i 2 = log E e I I is the log expected excess earnings and 2 i (= 2 ) the variance of the log excess earnings. Setting = 0; expressions (5) and (6) in the main text obtain.
Derivation of expressions (7) and (8): Earnings are endogenous and tradable.
It proceeds in the same way as above, except that the budget constraint is now:
Dividing it by e Y cm ; and taking logs on both sides, yields e c e y cm = e r p + log [1 + exp fw 0 e y cm g] : Taking a …rst order Taylor expansion of the log-budget constraint around E fw 0 e y cm g:
exp Efw 0 e ycmg 1+exp Efw 0 e ycmg E fw 0 e y cm g + + exp E fw 0 e y cm g 1 + exp E fw 0 e y cm g | {z }
<1
fw 0 e y cm g And using the de…nition of ; we can rewrite the …rst two terms on the RHS as log 
Since expressions (A.1) and (A.2) remain the same, we can insert them in the log-budget constraint:
2 i which substituted into the unchanged above log-Euler equations, yields:
If portfolio returns and earnings are independent, = 0; and expressions (7) and (8) obtain.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof proceeds in two steps: (1.i) we obtain the exact moments of the distribution of endogenous earnings e Y e ; instead of using its log-linearized …rst order Taylor expansion (A.2), and (1.ii) we compute the
using the chain rule of di¤erentiation:
( 1. Consider the expressions for labour earnings, (3), and for earnings in the risky occupation, (4). From the latter, we have that:
ln e I = ln I + s + e =) ln e I N ( i ; 2 i ) :
Hence:
implying that:
and from the properties of lognormally distributed variables, we have that (1 )I + e I = e Y e is going to be distributed as a shifted lognormal, with location parameter (1 )I :
Finally, we …nd out y and 2 y using the conditions:
V ar e Y e = V ar( e I)
From (13), we have that the RHS of (14) and (15) equal respectively:
(1 )I + E( e I) = (1 )I + exp
whereas from e Y e LN ( y ; 2 y ); the LHS of (14) and (15) 
Inserting these expressions into the LHS and the RHS of (14) and (15), we obtain: i into both, yields:
(1.ii) Computing the derivative
using the chain rule of di¤ erentiation: 
3 1 For realistic values of I and s, only when ! 0 + will the condition be violated. But, under the condition that s > 0, 2 (0; 1) because risk aversion only has a second order e¤ect under CRRA preferences (as in the classic Arrow portfolio choice problem). 11.9 CRRA < 1 6.5
Coefficient of variation of earnings (4)(5)
6.2-14.9
Number of households 2,954 10,207
Source: "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey (1) Direct stockholding : the household holds equities directly (3) The coefficient of relative risk aversion constructed as in Barskyet al. (1997) . (4) Household's characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, when there were two respondents, we imputed the one corresponding to the head of the household.
(5) Since five year ahead real income increases were unbounded above and below in the questionnaire, the two reported values for mean income risk are computed imposing lower and upper bounds of 50% of real income increases, and 100% respectively.
(2) Direct and indirect stockholding : the household holds equities either directly or through mutual funds (1) Probit (2) Since five year ahead real income increases were unbounded above and below in the questionnaire, income risk is computed imposing lower and upper bounds of 50% of real income increases. 0.219 * Households' characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, when there were two respondents, we imputed the one corresponding to the head of the household. Reference groups are: no diploma, single, CRRA ≥ 3.76, no specific management.
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(1) The dependent variable in demand equation (2) is the logistic transformation of the share (p) of risky assets in financial wealth: log p/(1-p). In Tobit estimation (3), the dependent variable is the share of risky assets in financial wealth.
2,384
(2) Demand equation (1) The dependent variable in demand equation (2) is the logistic transformation of the share (p) of risky assets in financial wealth: log p/(1-p). In Tobit estimation (3), the dependent variable is the share of risky assets in financial wealth. (2) Since five year ahead real income increases were unbounded above and below in the questionnaire, income risk is computed imposing lower and upper bounds of 100% of real income increases. * Households' characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, when there were two respondents, we imputed the one corresponding to the head of the household. Reference groups are: no diploma, single, CRRA ≥ 3.76, no specific management. (2) Given that the earnings variance is exogenous in the participation equation, the conditional demand is estimated following a twostep approach (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 567) . In the first stage we estimate the inverse Mills ratio from a probit of the discrete choice variable on the exogenous variables and the set of instruments. The second step estimates by 2SLS the conditional asset demand including the estimated inverse Mills ratio both in the set of regressors and in the set of instruments. The null hypothesis of exogeneity is tested using the usual t-statistic on the second stage estimated coefficient for the predicted errors of the first stage regression (reported as a chi-square statistic). To test whether instruments are exogenous, we regress the 2SLS predicted errors on the set of instruments (including the inverse Mills ratio).
(1) The probability is estimated by a two-step approach (Wooldridge, 2002, p.473) , where the first stage is a linear projection of the earnings variance on the instrument set, while the second is a Probit that includes the predicted errors of the first stage regression. The chi-square statistic reported is actually the (t-statistic)² of the coefficient estimate of the predicted errors. To test for the exogeneity of the instruments, we regress the Probit predicted residuals on the set of instruments. Rejection of contract C 
Pseudo R2 Dependent variable
Income risk (σ/y) 0.22
The dependent variables are qualitative except for income risk. There are four categories for "financial attitudes" (cf. infra ), three (yes several times a year, yes but rarely, no) for "horses race bets" (5.6%; 8.1%; 86.3%) and "national lotteries" (23.3%; 29.2%; 47.6%) and two (yes or no) for "slot machines" (8.7%; 91.3%) and "casino" (2.9%; 97.1%). The estimated qualitative regressions include the following covariates the coefficients of which are not reported : constant, age, sex, occupational dummies, labor income, marital status, number of children, unemployement dummies (past, actual), health problem dummies, urban/rural dummies and education (years). The tobit model of (σ/y) includes the same covariates for the household's head, and some characteristics of the parents' head : social status, dummies for financial difficulties during respondent's youth and portfolio composition dummies Slot machines 0.09 Casino 0.12
